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A Health System-Wide Problem
In 2007, the U.S. spent nearly $2.3 trillion on health care and public and private insurers
processed more than 4 billion health insurance claims. 1 The National Health Care Anti-Fraud
Association (NHCAA) has estimated that, conservatively, 3% of all health care spending—or
$68 billion—is lost to health care fraud. Other estimates by government and law enforcement
agencies place fraud-related losses as high as 10% of annual health care spending; 2 at this rate,
the losses in 2007 alone –over $220 billion – would have been enough to cover the uninsured.
What is absolutely clear from virtually every reliable source on the subject is that health care
fraud is a systemic problem affecting public and private insurers alike, in the individual market,
the employer-sponsored group market, and public programs. Because Medicare and Medicaid
are government-sponsored and thus are required to report on fraud, the problem is perhaps better
known, but combating fraud is a challenge that faces both public and private insurers. Indeed,
one survey found that since 1995, 90% of all private insurers have launched anti-fraud
campaigns. 3
The failure to systematically and routinely measure the scope of fraud is characteristic of the
insurance industry as a whole, and it is not limited to the United States. 4 Numerous government
agencies have reported that no segment of the health care delivery system is immune from fraud 5
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and that instance of fraud and abuse can be found involving all segments of the health care
industry and in every geographical area of the country. 6
Fraud is Not Improper Payment
Black’s Law Dictionary defines fraud as “a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or
concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” Improper
payments or overpayments may not involve fraud at all if a payment simply was made or
claimed in error. The law equates fraud with an intent to conceal or deceive or acting in a manner
that conveys a reckless disregard for the truth of one’s claims.
In the context of health insurance, fraud may manifest itself as deception of a public or private
health insurer into paying claims that are not owed, or a reckless disregard for the truthfulness of
claims that are submitted. Insurers have also been found to have engaged in fraud against group
sponsors and members, by conspiring to overcharge plan members in relation to the benefits that
were promised. This type of fraud is essentially an intentional manipulation of the claims
payment process for financial gain through bribes, kickbacks, and racketeering.
Fraud is distinct from improper payments under public programs, which can arise from simple
errors in documentation, coding, reporting, verification, and other technical matters related to the
administration of public programs. Improper payments are reported annually by federal agencies
under the Improper Payment Improvement Act of 2002 (IPIA).7 In recent years, as agencies
increasingly have implemented the law, the amount of reported improper payments has risen and
efforts have been undertaken to correct the underlying program administration standards and
procedures that give rise to improper payments. 8
How Widespread is Health Insurance Fraud and What Forms Does it Take?
Examples of fraudulent activity consist of fraudulent billing, kickbacks, up-coding services,
bundling, and ghost patients. Estimates are that 80% of healthcare fraud is committed by medical
providers, 10 percent by consumers, and the balance by others, such as insurers themselves and
their employees. 9
Table 1 presents an illustrative overview of the types of fraudulent conduct that have been
pursued in court or reported in the press in recent years. These examples have been drawn from a
systematic search of reported actions using legal search engines, as well as a review of legal
journal and news articles on health care fraud-related actions. The types of fraud recovery
actions described in Table 1 might be pursued privately by health insurers as civil fraud cases,
while state Attorneys General or the United States Department of Justice also have wide-ranging
powers under state and federal law to pursue health care fraud under numerous legal theories.
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These cases suggest that the most common type of fraud involves systematically overcharging
insurers for the cost of items and services for which payment is specified either by contract or in
law. Thus, for example, many pharmaceutical companies have been pursued by Medicaid
programs for failing to adhere to federal prescription drug rebate requirements, with resulting
major overcharges to state agencies. (Because the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
have not yet reported on cases of either improper payment or fraud under the Medicare Part D
program, 10 it is not possible to know the magnitude of such practices under Medicare). Similarly,
hospitals have been charged with systematically upcoding Medicare claims to falsely elevate the
cost of care.
Perhaps the most striking examples of fraud are those that involve the private health insurance
industry itself. In these cases, the deception can involve either overstating the insurer’s costs in
paying claims, or systematically and deceptively under-valuing the amount owed by the insurer
to a health care provider -- all with the intention of shifting increased responsibility for the cost
of care to the plan member and group sponsor, in ways that violate the terms of the contract:


In one recent New York case reported prominently in the press, 11 leading private insurers
were found to have manipulated the prices they paid for physician services in order to
systematically drive down the amount they owed for out-of-network physician care and
thereby drive up members’ financial exposure for the balance. This intentional
manipulation of provider payments resulted in an estimated 10% to 28% increase in
members’ direct financial exposure for the cost of out-of-network care.



A major hospital corporation-affiliated private insurer was found to have intentionally
misrepresented in its bills to plan members the true price of its own hospitals’ care, while
secretly negotiating deep discounts with its hospitals. As a result, plan members were
actually paying the majority of the hospital bills they incurred rather than the 20% copay
they were promised. 12

Vulnerable Populations Are the Most Likely Fraud Victims, Regardless of Whether the
Fraud is Public or Private
Medicare and Medicaid may be susceptible to fraud in part because many investigative reports
on victims of consumer swindles suggest that financial fraud is not uniformly distributed across
all households; instead, it disproportionately targets the elderly, women, minorities, the less
educated, and the poor. 13 In other words, Medicare and Medicaid fraud may reflect the
vulnerable nature of the populations that depend on the program rather than any failing on the
part of either program. As a result, simply moving away from Medicare and Medicaid coverage
and toward a system of private health insurance subsidies would in and of itself do nothing to
curb fraud; it simply would privatize the victimizing of the poor and vulnerable.
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What Have Medicare and Medicaid Done to Combat Fraud?
Federal law contains extensive provisions to combat fraud in Medicare and Medicaid. Federal
laws impose both civil and criminal liability for false claims, bribes and kickbacks, and
racketeering. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 14 created the
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program (under joint direction of Attorney General and
Secretary of Dept. of Health and Human Services), a far-reaching program to combat fraud and
abuse in health care, including both private and public health insurance plans. In FY 2007: the
federal government won or negotiated approximately $1.8 billion in judgments and
settlements. 15
Similarly, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 16 contains provisions aimed at strengthening
Medicaid anti-fraud protections. The provisions provide economic incentives to states that enact
state false claims laws for use in Medicaid fraud suits, while requiring Medicaid providers to do
more to combat fraud.
Finally, 2009 legislation amending the Civil False Claims Act (Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act (FERA) 17 expands scope of liability under False Claims Act and gives government enhanced
investigative powers.
Table 2 shows the past decade of fraud recoveries. As the Table indicates, Medicaid recoveries
have steadily increased as the laws have been toughened. As the impact of the 2006 reforms and
greater public policy attention to fraud grows, these recovery figures can be expected to increase
still further.
Conclusion
Fraud – whether committed by health care providers, plan members, or insurers themselves – is
an unfortunate but real part of the health care landscape. As the national health reform legislation
takes shape, keeping an attentive eye on anti-fraud provisions will be a critical element of
reform. Since the victims of fraud are disproportionately likely to be lower income and
vulnerable populations, the central issue will be not whether public programs serve as the basis
of expanded insurance program but whether anti-fraud safeguards are a firm, fixed feature of
final reform legislation. This means considering steps to strengthen the reach and scope of the
HIPAA insurance fraud provisions of 1996, including strong protections related to marketing,
enrollment, consumer protections, health care access, and claims payment into final legislation,
requiring anti-fraud compliance procedures for all insurers participating in a reformed health care
system, and sufficiently funding federal and state oversight agencies to assure that cases of fraud
are quickly detected and addressed.
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Table 1. Health Care Fraud Across the Health Care Industry: Private Health Insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid
Private Health Insurance ACCUSED COMPANY
UnitedHealth 1

INDUSTRY
Managed Care

McKesson 2

Pharmaceutical

HealthNet 4

Managed Care

Cleveland Clinic 5

Integrated Health Care
System
Hospital
Pharmaceutical

Tenet 6
TAP Pharmaceuticals 7
St. Barnabas Hospitals 8
HCA 9
HealthSouth 10
Ciena Healthcare
Management, Inc. 11

Hospital
Hospital
Rehabilitative Medicine
Services
Nursing Home

Medicare

Medicaid

TYPE OF FRAUD
Underpaid consumers (10%28%) by manipulating database
it used to pay customers for outof-network services
Fraudulently inflated prices of
approximately 450 drugs
charged to insurers and
consumers
ERISA and RICO violations by
underpaying consumers in
several states
Medical identity theft; false
claims
False claims, Kickbacks
False claims, Conspiracy,
kickbacks
False claims
False claims, kickbacks
False claims

RECOVERY
$350 million

False claims from inadequate
care in nutrition and hydration,
the assessment and evaluation of
needs, care planning and nursing
interventions, medication
management, fall prevention,
and pressure ulcer care,
including the prevention
and treatment of wounds.

$1.25 million 12

$350 million 3

$215 million

Unknown
$900 million
$ 559.5 million
$265 million
$631 million
$325 million
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13

ACCUSED COMPANY
United Health Group and
other insurers 13

INDUSTRY
Insurance

Humana

Insurance

Amerigroup 14

Insurance/Managed Care

Merck 15

Pharmaceutical

Serono Group 16
AstraZenica Pharmaceuticals 17
Wyeth 18
Bristol-Meyers Squibb 19 , KV
Pharmaceuticals, Roxane
Laboratories, Abbott
Laboratories, Aventis
Pharmaceutical, Teva
Pharmaceuticals, Schering
Plow/Warrick, Forest
Laboratories, Baxter
International, Dey
Pharmaceuticals, Bayer
Pharmaceuticals
Omnicare, Inc. 20

Pharmaceutical

TYPE OF FRAUD
Fraud, misrepresentation,
deception through use of
company-owned Ingenix system
to systematically undervalue its
payment obligations for
physician services in order to
shift the cost of out-of-network
coverage from the insurer to
members and plan sponsors
Fraud, deception involving
concealment of the actual cost of
hospital services from plan
members
False claims involving the
treatment of pregnant women
and other patients
False claims,
Kickbacks
False claims, Kickbacks

Pharmaceutical

False Claims

Pharmaceutical

False claims by replacing brandname with generic drugs or
switching dosage strengths

RECOVERY
Approximately $100 million

$225 million

$650 million
$567 million
$160 million
Qui tam action pending
$123.75 million

$49.5 million
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Table 2. Federal Health Care Fraud and Abuse Program Recoveries by Fiscal Year 1
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